By George Grant
Tripoli, 11 September:
Mahmoud Jibril has . . .[restrict]played a prominent role in Libyan political life ever since Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi brought him into the previous regime as part of his modernisation programme in 2007.
Having served as head of the National Economic Development Board as well as National Planning Council, Jibril defected from the regime along with several other leading figures at the outset of last year’s pro-democracy in uprising.
The former minister’s decision to abandon the regime at a time when the revolution’s success was far from assured earned him plaudits with many Libyans and paved the way for his subsequent emergence as one of the country’s most popular grass-roots politicians.
Others criticised Jibril for the large amount of time he spent outside of the country during the fighting, although his supporters have argued that garnering and maintaining international support was central to his role as the National Transitional Council’s de facto prime minister, given the body’s central function as an interlocutor between Libyan revolutionaries and the outside world.
Following the fall of Sirte in October 2011, Jibril resigned from the NTC, a move he said was consistent with a prior pledge to stand down once the fighting was over, although conflict with other leading members appears also to have been a factor. Others have said the decision was part of a calculated move to prepare himself for a re-entry into political life ahead of the forthcoming national elections.
Five months later, on 14 March 2012, Jibril duly re-emerged in the Libyan national consciousness when he was elected leader of the National Forces Alliance, a 58-party and organization coalition that stood as a single political entity in July’s National Congress elections.
The NFA – which both supporters and opponents have described as towards the liberal-pragmatic end of the political spectrum – won a comprehensive victory in the elections, taking 39 of the 80 seats available for political parties, against no fewer than 130 rivals.
Many people have put the NFA’s success down to Jibril’s widespread popularity amongst ordinary Libyans, together with the fact that he was one of the few recognisable faces of the elections, in spite of the fact that he did not actually stand for a seat in the Congress.
Others have argued that an additional significant factor was a lingering suspicion amongst many Libyans of the Muslim Brotherhood and other avowedly Islamist groups. The Brotherhood’s Justice & Construction party won just 17 seats in the elections, fewer than half the number taken by the NFA.
Although Jibril has repeatedly refuted claims that he is a secularist, he was nevertheless characterised as the ‘liberal’ face of the elections, in particular by the international media.
A comparatively late entrant into the race for prime minister, Jibril does not enjoy the same level of popularity inside the Congress as he does in the country as a whole.
Frequently described as stand-offish, many Congressmen and women have come to resent what they claim is his Machiavellian style of politics, not least his undisguised ambition to play the kingmaker. On the other hand he is also seen as the toughest of the candidates, the man who will take hard decisions and get them implemented.
Having led the NFA to victory in the elections, whilst not actually standing himself, Jibril subsequently attempted to get the independent congressman Ali Zidan installed as head of the Congress in August’s Speaker’s race.
That latter effort failed when a deal between himself and the Islamists fell apart shortly before the vote, resulting in Zidan’s defeat at the hands of Mohammed Magarief, whom the Islamists subsequently supported as a compromise choice.
Indeed, Jibril’s decision to stand directly for prime minister, as opposed to attempting to anoint a chosen candidate, has come as something of a surprise in certain quarters. Many had speculated that Jibril’s run for political office would come if-and-when the office of president was created, with election depending not on the Congress but a direct vote from the Libyan people. The post is seen as one he could easily win.
However, with the Congress having seemingly opted against the creation of such a position during this next phase of the transition, and the outcome of the Constituent Assembly’s deliberations (whatever they may be) still 18 months away, it is believed that Jibril felt that a failure to stand for prime minister now could permanently reduce his political influence going forwards.
Regarding the likely direction of a Jibril premiership, it is probably safe to say the circumstances will, to a great extent, determine the decisions that are made over the next 18 months.
Whoever wins will need to prioritise economic redevelopment, including deploying Libya’s vast oil revenues into developing new job and wealth-creating sectors such as tourism, as well as attracting international business into the country.
A US-educated technocrat, Jibril has come out in support of opening the Libyan economy up to foreign investment and maximising export potential. He has also spoken in favour of privatising some sectors of the Libyan economy, although specifics remain undefined.
As with many of his peers, Jibril is a strong supporter of decentralisation. The row with the eastern federalists in the run-up to the elections reminded everyone of the dangers of neglecting demands for regional empowerment, and there appears to be little appetite for continuing the absurdly over-centralised system developed under Qaddafi.
During its election campaign, the NFA came out in support of devolving responsibility for sectors such as healthcare, education and transport to regional control, as well as modifying the tax system so that a proportion of taxes raised locally would be returned to those areas.
On security, Jibril will inevitably focus on militia disarmament and reintegration, together with the development of a regular army and police. One area where he is expected to differ from his more avowedly Islamist rivals would be his relationship with the Supreme Security Committee, many of whose leading elements are Islamist.
The question of whether to tackle the SSC head-on or else to normalise its existence within the security framework will be crucial, and Jibril may choose to adopt the more robust approach, with as yet unforeseeable consequences.
On matters of religion, Jibril will be unlikely to do anything to compromise Libya’s essential character as an Islamic state, and he will support the implementation of Sharia as the basis of the law.
However, he is also likely to advocate a comparatively laissez-faire approach from the government on religious issues, arguing that it is not the role of politicians to instruct Libyans how to practice their faith.
Jibril has also spoken repeatedly of the need for reconciliation in Libya.
Immediately following his success in the elections, he launched a charm offensive with the federalists, describing them as “patriots” and pledging to ensure their views were heard in the Congress even though – having boycotted the elections – they had no seats there.
Jibril is also recognised as one of the more promising figures when it comes to reconciliation with Qaddafi loyalists. Himself a former member of the regime, Jibril also hails from the Warfallah tribe, whose seat is Bani Walid, one of the most pro-Qaddafi towns in Libya.
One final factor to look out for will be the importance of personality in determining Libya’s direction over the next 18 months. Of critical importance will be the relationship between the Congress speaker and the prime minister, and here a Jibril premiership could prove interesting.
Unlike the other front-runner for prime minister, Mustafa Abushagur, Jibril is not a close friend and ally of Mohammed Magarief. Also unlike Abushagur, Jibril is seen as a naturally combative personality less prone to compromise.
As yet, neither the full remit of the speaker nor the nature of his relationship with the prime minister have been fully calibrated, and the outcome of that process could have as much to do with the personalities of those occupying the posts as with any formal and pre-determined procedure. [/restrict]
