The judicial system in Libya is becoming deeply fractured because of different top constitutional courts operating in Tripoli and Benghazi, with each possibly making contradictory appointments and decisions.
This was made more of a reality when a group representing the Supreme Judicial Council (SCJ) took over the offices in Tripoli of the SJC.
Moreover, last Tuesday (24 February), the SJC, headed by Mufrah Al-Qawi, announced that it was temporarily moving to Benghazi both its Department for the Inspection of Judicial Bodies and its Cases Department. All new cases, it said, should for the time being submitted to the office in Benghazi.
These actions have pitted the head of the Supreme Court, Abdullah Burziza, and the head of the SJC, Muftah Al-Qawi, against each other, and have also created open warfare between Burziza and House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Ageela Saleh.
This, is despite the fact that Burziza was appointed by the HoR and sworn into office by Ageela Saleh in September 2022 after being nominated by the Supreme Court’s General Assembly.
In the conflict between the Supreme Court and the SJC, the SJC, headed by, Muftah Al-Qawi, are generally seen by the Supreme Court, the State Council and the GNU as siding with the HoR.
Analysts believe this has made the prospect of Libya’s judicial system splitting a closer reality.
At the heart of the division are the moves by the HoR to take greater control over constitutional decisions by the courts.
The timeline in the divisions which have now resulted in the takeover of the SJC stem from the following:
In December 2022, the HoR voted to replace the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court with a 13-member Supreme Constitutional Court whose members it appointed. This law was subsequently ruled invalid in June 2023 by the Constitutional Chamber of Tripoli-based Supreme Court and then declared suspended by the Presidency Council in September 2024.
The HoR’s Supreme Constitutional Court became functional in December 2025 and is based in Benghazi and on 18 January 2026 nullified a 2014 judgement of the Tripoli-based Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber that had invalidated the HoR elections that year.
The Benghazi court also upheld Law No. 1/2020, which annulled legislation enacted after August 2014 by the former General National Congress.
· In response, on 28 January this year, the Tripoli-based Constitutional Chamber declared four HoR laws invalid:
– Law No. 22/2023 amending the law on the SJC, including giving the HoR the power to appoint the head of the SJC.
– Law No. 32/2023 further amending the law on the SJC, and in particular including requiring the head of the SJC to take the legal oath before the HoR Speaker.
– Law No. 6/2015 granting an amnesty to those convicted of certain crimes from the time of the revolution to the law’s date of issuance.
Meanwhile, in its countermove, on 15 February this year, the Benghazi-based Supreme Constitutional Court then issued rulings annulling the Tripoli-based Chamber’s 28 January decision.
The Benghazi court also declared as unconstitutional an earlier HoR decision to appoint the President of the Supreme Court, Abdullah Burziza (following an appeal filed by 10 HoR members).
· In a separate case at the same time filed by Ageela Saleh, the Benghazi court ruled that the Tripoli-based Constitutional Chamber’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of the four laws issued by the House of Representatives was null and void, “because it lacks jurisdiction to rule on constitutional cases”.
Part of Libya’s political split
The current crisis in Libya’s judicial system simply reflects Libya’s continued political split between the western and eastern regimes. It could be said that it has been quite surprising that the fracture did not happen earlier. Ultimately, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Division, will rule on constitutional matters which will ultimately affect the division of power and elections.
