The Tripoli based Libyan government of Abdel Hamid Aldabaiba issued a seven-point response yesterday to the criticism it received from the House of Representatives (HoR) for first withholding landing permission to and then militarily blocking the landing of aircraft carrying HoR members at, Zintan airport.
Here is its response in full:
‘‘In response to the statement issued by the leadership of the House of Representatives (HoR) concerning the alleged prevention of the HoR from holding sessions outside its headquarters in Benghazi, the Tripoli based Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) asserts that this issue cannot be addressed in isolation from the political and legal reality governing the operations of existing institutions. The government clarifies the following:
First: By aligning itself politically and utilizing legislation to serve a specific political agenda, the HoR leadership has positioned the HoR as a party to the political conflict. Consequently, the government rejects any attempt to use the relocation of the HoR’s sessions as a means to impose a new political and institutional reality outside the framework of national consensus.
Second: The government engaged positively with the election of the new HoR leadership, establishing channels of communication based on their pledges to move away from the approach of the previous leadership, respect the mandates of state institutions, coordinate with them, and uphold the principle of national consensus. However, subsequent actions quickly revealed that the current leadership is continuing along the same path as its predecessor. Changing the individuals in charge neither renews the HoR’s mandate, expands its competencies, nor grants it new legitimacy.
Third: The HoR leadership’s talk of being "prevented" or "excluded" raises a legitimate question: Would the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, and the Government of National Unity be permitted to hold their own meetings in the eastern region and engage directly with citizens there, in order to carry out their respective duties?
Fourth: The leadership of the HoR must recognize that the HoR—even prior to the conclusion of the Libyan Political Agreement (signed in the city of Skhirat Morocco on 17 December 2015)—was merely a provisional legislative authority with limited jurisdiction, as defined by the constitutional and legal framework under which it was elected. The Supreme Court affirmed this by stipulating that the House’s powers are contingent upon the nature of the transitional phase and the objectives for which it was established. The fact that twelve years have passed since its election does not transform it into an absolute legislative authority, nor does it grant it powers it did not originally possess.
Fifth: The Libyan Political Agreement reshaped the institutional landscape and established political bodies based on a shared, consensual legitimacy. This agreement—not the 2014 election—is the very basis for the continued existence of the HoR itself. The Agreement imposes obligations upon the HoR that its leadership cannot disregard—foremost among them the requirement to reach a consensus with the High Council of State regarding the unification of the seven sovereign positions and the adoption of electoral legislation. It is inconsistent for the HoR leadership to uphold the Libyan Political Agreement insofar as it secures the HoR’s own survival, while simultaneously ignoring the provisions that constrain its authority.
Sixth: Neither the track record of the previous HoR leadership nor the practices of the current one provide the government with any reason to feel reassured by their recent actions. The previous leadership utilized legislation to prolong the transitional phase, entrench institutional division, and enact electoral laws that lacked consensus. This legislative approach even extended to the judiciary, sowing division within a branch that had previously remained unified despite the broader fragmentation of the country. It is ironic that the current leadership of the HoR is now calling for a unified geographical territory for the HoR’s operations, while simultaneously continuing the approach of its predecessor—an approach that contributed to undermining the state’s institutional unity.
Seventh: The Government of National Unity—established under the roadmap emerging from the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum as the final government of the transitional phase—rejects, in line with its responsibilities, any project or measure aimed at prolonging this phase, replicating it, or entrenching the existing political bodies. In this context, the government views the recent actions of the HoR’ leadership—including efforts to hold sessions outside the HoR’s designated seat—not as a step toward ending the transitional phase, but rather as a means to solidify it, at the expense of holding elections and transferring power to elected institutions.
The question that the leadership of the HoR must answer today is not where the HoR should hold its sessions, but rather: what has it actually accomplished to bring the transitional phase to an end? It is not expected to seek new venues to exercise the HoR’s temporary authority; instead, it should focus on fulfilling the requirements for the conclusion of its mandate and returning the mandate to the Libyan people, so that they may—of their own free will—choose their permanent governing authorities.’’
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